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Abstract
The decentralized nature of federated learning makes detecting and defending
against adversarial attacks a challenging task. This paper focuses on backdoor
attacks in the federated learning setting, where the goal of the adversary is to
reduce the performance of the model on targeted tasks while maintaining a good
performance on the main task. Unlike existing works, we allow non-malicious
clients to have correctly labeled samples from the targeted tasks. We conduct a
comprehensive study of backdoor attacks and defenses for the EMNIST dataset,
a real-life, user-partitioned, and non-iid dataset. We observe that in the absence
of defenses, the performance of the attack largely depends on the fraction of
adversaries present and the “complexity” of the targeted task. Moreover, we show
that norm clipping and “weak” differential privacy mitigate the attacks without
hurting the overall performance. We have implemented the attacks and defenses
in TensorFlow Federated (TFF), a TensorFlow framework for federated learning.
In open sourcing our code, our goal is to encourage researchers to contribute new
attacks and defenses and evaluate them on standard federated datasets.
1 Introduction
Modern machine learning systems can be vulnerable to various kinds of failures, such as bugs in
preprocessing pipelines and noisy training labels, as well as attacks that target each step of the
system’s training and deployment pipelines. Examples of attacks include data and model update
poisoning (5; 21), model evasion (29; 5; 16), model stealing (30), and data inference attacks on users’
private training data (27).
The distributed nature of federated learning (23), particularly when augmented with secure aggre-
gation protocols (7), makes detecting and correcting for these failures and attacks a particularly
challenging task. Adversarial attacks can be broadly classified into two types based on the goal
of the attack, untargeted or targeted attacks. Under untargeted attacks (6; 15; 12), the goal of the
adversary is to corrupt the model in such a way that it does not achieve a near-optimal performance
on the main task at hand (e.g., classification) often referred to as the primary task. Under targeted
attacks (often referred to as backdoor attacks) (10; 19; 17), the goal of the adversary is to ensure that
the learned model behaves differently on certain targeted sub-tasks while maintaining good overall
performance on the primary task. For example, in image classification, the attacker may want the
model to misclassify some “green cars” as birds while ensuring that other cars are correctly classified.
For both targeted and untargeted attacks, the attacks can be further classified into two types based
on the capability of the attacker, model update poisoning or data poisoning. In data poisoning
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attacks (5; 28; 33; 25; 18), the attacker can change a subset of all the training samples which is
unknown to the learner. In federated learning systems, since the training process is done on local
devices, fully compromised clients can change the model update completely, which is called a model
poisoning attack (3; 4). Model update poisoning attacks are even harder to counter when secure
aggregation (SecAgg) (7), which ensures that the server cannot inspect each user’s update, is deployed
in the aggregation of local updates.
Since untargeted attacks reduce the overall performance of the primary task, they are easier to detect.
On the other hand, backdoor targeted attacks are harder to detect as the goal of the adversary is often
unknown a priori. Hence, following (3; 4), we consider targeted model update poisoning attacks
and refer to them as backdoor attacks. Existing approaches against backdoor attacks (28; 20; 31;
13; 32; 26) either require a careful examination of the training data or full control of the training
process at the server, which may not apply in the federated learning case. We evaluate various attacks
proposed in recent papers and defenses on a medium scale federated learning task with more realistic
parameters using TensorFlow Federated (1). Our goal, in open sourcing our code, is to encourage
researchers to evaluate new attacks and defenses on standard tasks.
2 Backdoor Attack Scenario
We consider the notations and definitions of federated learning as defined in (23).2 In particular, let
K be the total number of users. At each round t, the server randomly selects C ⋅K clients for some
C < 1. Let St be this set and nk be the number of samples at client k. Denote the model parameters
at round t by wt. Each selected user computes a model update, denoted by ∆wkt , based on their local
data. The server updates its model by aggregating the ∆wkt ’s, i.e.,
wt+1 = wt + η∑k∈St nk∆wkt∑k∈St nk .
where η is the server learning rate. We model the parameters of backdoor attacks as follows.
Sampling of adversaries. If  fraction of the clients are completely compromised, then each round
may contain anywhere between 0 and min( ⋅K,C ⋅K) adversaries. Under random sampling of
clients, the number of adversaries in each round follows a hypergeometric distribution. We refer to
this attack model as the random sampling attack. Another model we consider in this work is the fixed
frequency attack, where a single adversary appears in every f rounds (3; 4). For a fair comparison
between the two attack models, we set the frequency to be inversely proportional to the number of
total number of attackers (i.e., f = 1/( ⋅C ⋅K)).
Backdoor tasks. Recall that in backdoor attacks, the goal of the adversary is to ensure that the model
fails on some targeted tasks. For example, in text classification the backdoor task might be to suggest
a particular restaurant’s name after observing the phrase “my favorite restaurant is”. Unlike (3; 4),
we allow non-malicious clients to have correctly labeled samples from the targeted backdoor tasks.
For instance, if the adversary wants the model to misclassify some green cars as birds, we allow
non-malicious clients to have samples from these targeted green cars correctly labeled as cars.
Further, we form the backdoor task by grouping examples from multiple selected “target clients”.
Since examples from different target clients follow different distributions, we refer to the number
of target clients as the “number of backdoor tasks” and explore its effect on the attack’s success
rate. Intuitively, the more backdoor tasks we have, the richer the feature space the attacker is trying
to break, and therefore the harder it is for the attacker to successfully backdoor the model without
breaking its performance on the main task.
3 Model Update Poisoning Attacks
We focus on model update poisoning attacks based on the model replacement paradigm proposed
by (3; 4). When only one attacker is selected in round t (WLOG assume it is client 1), the attacker
attempts to replace the whole model by a backdoored model w∗ by sending
∆w1t = β(w∗ −wt). (1)
2While (23) considers relatively small problems, in more realistic scenarios for mobile devices we might
have K = 107 or higher, with the number of clients selected C ⋅K typically constant, say 100 to 1000 per round.
2
where β = ∑k∈St nk
ηnk
is a boost factor. Then we have
∆wt+1 = w∗ + η∑k∈St,k≠1 nk∆wkt∑k∈St nk ,
which will be in a small neighbourhood of w∗ if we assume the model has sufficiently converged and
hence the other updates ∆wkt for k > 1 are small. If multiple attackers appear in the same round, we
assume that they can coordinate with each other and divide this update evenly.
Obtaining a backdoored model. To obtain a backdoored model w∗, we assume that the attacker has
a set Dmal which describes the backdoor task – for example, different kinds of green cars labeled as
birds. We also assume the attacker has a set of training samples generated from the true distribution
Dtrn. Note that for practical applications, such data may be harder for the attacker to obtain.
Unconstrained boosted backdoor attack. In this case, the adversary trains a model w∗ based on
wt,Dmal and Dtrn without any constraints and sends the update based on (1) back to the service
provider. One popular training strategy is to initialize with wt and train the model with Dtrn ∪Dmal
for a few epoches. This attack generally results in a large update norm and can serve as a baseline.
Norm bounded backdoor attack. Unconstrained backdoor attacks can be defended by norm
clipping as discussed below. To overcome this, we consider the norm bounded backdoor attack. Here
at each round, the model trains on the backdoor task subject to the constraint that the model update is
smaller than M/β. Thus, model update has norm bounded by M after boosted by a factor of β. This
can be done by training the model using multiple rounds of projected gradient descent, where in each
round we train the model using the unconstrainted training strategy and project it back to the `2 ball
of size M/β around wt.
4 Defenses
We consider the following defenses for backdoor attacks.
Norm thresholding of updates. Since boosted attacks are likely to produce updates with large
norms, a reasonable defense is for the server to simply ignore updates whose norm is above some
threshold M ; in more complex schemes M could even be chosen in randomized fashion. However, in
the spirit of investigating what a strong adversary might accomplish, we assume the adversary knows
the threshold M , and can hence always return malicious updates within this magnitude. Giving this
strong advantage to the adversary makes the norm-bounding defense equivalent to the following
norm-clipping approach:
∆wt+1 = ∑
k∈St
∆wkt+1
max(1, ∣∣∆wkt+1∣∣2/M) .
This model update ensures that the norm of each model update is small and hence less susceptible to
the server.
(Weak) differential privacy. A mathematically rigorous way for defending against backdoor tasks is
to train models with differential privacy (22; 14; 2). These approaches were extended to the federated
setting by (24), by first clipping updates (as above) and then adding Gaussian noise. We explore
the effect of this method. However, traditionally the amount of noise added to obtain reasonable
differential privacy is relatively large. Since our goal is not privacy, but instead preventing attacks,
we add a small amount of noise that is empirically sufficient to limit the success of attacks.
5 Experiments
In the above backdoor attack framework, we conduct experiments on the EMNIST dataset (11; 9)3.
This dataset is a writer-annotated handwritten digit classification dataset collected from 3383 users
with roughly 100 images of digits per user. Each of them has their unique writing style. We train a
five-layer convolution neural network with two convolution layers, one max-pooling layer and two
dense layers using federated learning in the TensorFlow Federated framework (1). At each round of
3Code available at https://github.com/tensorflow/federated/tree/master/tensorflow_
federated/python/research/targeted_attack.
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training, we select C ⋅K = 30 clients. Each client trains the model with their own local data for 5
epochs with batch size 20 and client learning rate 0.1. We use a server learning rate of 1.
In the experiment, we consider the backdoor task as classifying 7s from multiple selected “target
clients” as 1s. Note that our attack approach does not require 7s from other clients to be classified as
1s. Since 7s coming from different target clients follow different distributions (because they have
different writing styles), we refer to the number of target clients as the “number of backdoor tasks”.
Random sampling vs. fixed frequency attacks. To begin with, we conduct experiments for the
two attack models discussed in Section 2 under different fractions of adversaries. The results are
shown in Figure 1 (for unconstrained attack) and Figure 2 (for norm bounded attack). Additional
plots are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 in the appendix. The figures show that both attack models
have similar behaviors, despite fixed frequency attacks being slightly more effective than random
sampling attacks. Furthermore, in the fixed frequency attack, it is easier to see if the attack happened
in a particular round or not. Hence, to provide additional advantage for the attacker and for ease of
interpretability, we focus our analysis on fixed-frequency attacks in the rest of this section.
Fraction of corrupted users. In Figure 1 and Figure 2 (also Figure 5 and Figure 6 in the appendix),
we consider a malicious task with 30 backdoor tasks (around 300 images). We perform unconstrained
attacks and norm-bounded attacks with  = 3.3%,0.33% fraction of users being malicious. Both
fixed-frequency attack (left column) and random sampling (right column) attacks are considered. For
fixed-frequency attack, this corresponds to attacking frequency of 1 (attacking every round), and 1/10
(once every ten rounds). From the above experiment, we can infer that the backdoor attack success
largely depends on the fraction of adversaries and the performance of backdoor attack degrades as
the fraction of fully compromised users falls below 1%.
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Figure 1: Unconstrained attack for fixed-frequency attacks (left column) and random sampling
attack (right column) with different fractions of attackers. Green line is the cumulative mean for the
backdoor accuracy.
Number of backdoor tasks. The number of backdoor tasks affects the performance in two ways.
First, the more backdoor tasks we have, the harder it is to backdoor a fixed-capacity model while
maintaining its performance on the main task. Second, since we assume benign users have correct
samples from the backdoor task, they can correct the attacked model with these samples. In Figure 3,
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Figure 2: Constrained attack with norm bound 10 for fixed-frequency attacks (left column) and
random sampling attack (right column) with different fractions of attackers. Green line is the
cumulative mean for the backdoor accuracy.
we consider norm bounded attack with norm bound 10 and 10, 20, 30, 50 backdoor tasks. We can see
from the plot that the more backdoor tasks we have, the harder it is to fit a malicious model.
Norm bound for the update. In Figure 4(a), we consider norm bounded update from each user. We
assume one attacker appears in every round, which corresponds to  = 3.3% corrupted users, and we
consider norm bounds of 3, 5, and 10 (the 90 percentile of benign users’ updates are below 2 for most
of the rounds), which translates to 0.1,0.17,0.33 norm bound for the update before boosting. We can
see from the plot that selecting 3 as the norm bound will successfully mitigate the attack with almost
no effect on the performance of the main task. Hence we can see that norm bounding may be a valid
defense for current backdoor attacks.
Weak differential privacy In Figure 4(b), we consider norm bounding plus adding Gaussian noise.
We use norm bound of 5, which itself would not mitigate the attack, and add independent Gaussian
noise with variance 0.025 to each coordinate. From the plots, we can see that adding Gaussian noise
can also help mitigate the attack beyond norm clipping without hurting the overall performance much.
We note that similar to previous works on differential privacy (2), we do not provide a recipe for
selecting the norm bound and variance of the Gaussian noise. Rather, we show that some reasonable
values motivated by differential privacy literature perform well. Discovering algorithms to learn these
bounds and noise values remains an interesting open research direction.
6 Discussion
We studied backdoor attacks and defenses for federated learning under the more realistic EMNIST
dataset. In the absence of any defense, we showed that the performance of the adversary largely
depends on the fraction of adversaries present. Hence, for reasonable success, there needs to be
a large number of adversaries. Perhaps surprisingly norm clipping limits the success of known
backdoor attacks considerably. Furthermore, adding a small amount of Gaussian noise, in addition to
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Figure 3: The Effect of Backdoor Size for Constrained Attack with Norm Bound 10.
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Figure 4: Effect of norm bounding and Gaussian noise. Dotted: main task. Solid: backdoor task.
norm clipping, can help further mitigate the effect of adversaries. This gives rise to several interesting
questions.
Better attacks and defenses. In the norm bounded case, multiple iterations of “pre-boosted”
projected gradient descent may not be the best possible attack in a single round. In fact,the adversary
may attempt to directly craft the “worst-case” model update that satisfies the norm bound (without
any boosting). Moreover, if the attacker knows they can attack in multiple rounds, there might be
better strategies for doing so under a norm bound. Similarly, more advanced defenses should be
investigated.
Effect of model capacity. Another factor that may affect the performance of backdoor attacks is the
model capacity, especially that it is conjectured that backdoor attacks use the spare capacity of the
deep network (20). How model capacity interacts with backdoor attacks is an interesting question to
consider both from the theoretical and practical sides.
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Interaction of defenses with SecAgg. Existing approaches on range proofs (e.g. BulletProof (8))
can guarantee this when using secure multiparty computation but how to implement them in a
computationally and communication efficient way is still an active research direction. This can also
be made compatible with SecAgg if we have an efficient implementation of multi-party range proof.
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A Additional figures for experiments
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Figure 5: Unconstrained attack for fixed-frequency attacks (left column) and random sampling
attack (right column) with different fractions of attackers. Green line is the cumulative mean for the
backdoor accuracy.
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(c) Attack frequency = 1/5 ( = 0.67%)
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(d) Number of attackers = 23 ( = 0.67%)
Figure 6: Constrained attack with norm bound 10 for fixed-frequency attacks (left column) and
random sampling attack (right column) with different fractions of attackers. Green line is the
cumulative mean for the backdoor accuracy.
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